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This study evaluates econometrically the effect of government support to agriculture on a
measure of the affordability of food in 10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries. The panel model we construct specifically utilizes two
values calculated by the OECD: Producer Support Estimates as a percentage of gross farm
receipts and the Consumer Nominal Protection Coefficient. These two variables represent
transfers from taxpayers to agricultural producers through government programs and
transfers from consumers to government through protectionist measures, respectively. By
using dummy variables, we find implications for groups of countries on the basis of their
relative levels of support and protection.
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In the early 21st century, the rising incidence
of obesity throughout the developed world
provides an illustration of an issue involving
the intersection of health, agriculture, and
economics. The increase in overweight and
obesity in the United States is well-document-
ed and well known. According to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the
percentage of obese adults in the United States
increased from 14.6% in 1971 to 32.1% in
2004 (NCHS).
Although the proportion of obese adults in
the U.S. population might be the highest of
any nation, several developed and developing
nations have also experienced similar increases
in obesity. According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), when measured between 1999 and
2005, the populations of obese adults in
Australia, Canada, Greece, Mexico, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom all exceed-
ed 20%. Only the U.S. obese adult population
exceeded 30%.
Numerous articles published over the last
10 years both in economics and health–and
nutrition–related disciplines have attempted to
determine the source of this rise in obesity.
Such studies have found the fall in labor-
intensive employment and the increase in food
consumption among the factors leading to the
rise in obesity in the United States (Cutler,
Glaeser, and Shapiro; Lakdawalla and Philip-
son; Philipson and Posner). Primarily since the
2002 U.S. farm bill, the popular press has
frequently depicted U.S. agricultural com-
modity programs as an important contributor
to rising obesity (Meerman; Pollan). Such
reports allege these support programs increase
the availability of the most fattening foods at
relatively low prices because the mix of crops
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building blocks of such foods. However, far
fewer research articles in academia have
empirically investigated any presupposed rela-
tionship between obesity and U.S. agricultural
policy.
This paper builds on the work of Miller and
Coble, who investigate a relationship between
direct government payments to producers in
the United States over a 35- to 40-year period.
By constructing autoregressive (AR(1)) and
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models,
they determine that direct government pay-
ments to U.S. producers are not a significant
factor affecting the affordability of food.
Thei results hold for food in the aggregate, as
well as across different food groups. Signifi-
cant explanatory variables in their models
include consumer incomes and advances in
technology.
The model in this paper uses data from the
OECD and the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO) of the United Nations to evaluate
the effectsof the OECD measure of government
support to agriculture, known as a producer
support estimate (PSE), and the Consumer
Nominal Protection Coefficient (CNPC), a
complementary measure of the effects on
consumers of government policies. These effects
are measured for 10 OECD nations, including
the United States. Other factors examined by
the model include an index of agricultural
productivity and the value added to each
nation’s economy from agriculture as a per-
centage of gross domestic product.
Literature Review
As noted above, many articles published in
only a few years attempt to explain the sources
and causes of rising obesity, as well as the
extent of the problem. The United States is
perhaps the most dramatic example of how
this problem has increased. However, our
study takes a broader look at the issue by
examining OECD member countries, which is
relevant because, as Bleich et al., p. 5, note, the
majority of the world’s obese live in the
developed world. In fact, the authors find that
their analysis of the OECD health database
‘‘suggests a worldwide time-related phe-
nomenon’’ in the rise of obesity. Indeed, the
World Health Organization (WHO) has
coined the term ‘‘globesity’’ to describe the
pervasiveness of the problem throughout the
world.
Economists can examine relationships be-
tween food and overweight and obesity
through the cost of food and the cost of
physical activity. For our study, the effect of
food prices is the most pertinent, and a
considerable body of recent literature docu-
ments these results. The widely cited paper by
Lakdawalla and Philipson, for example, indi-
cates as much as 40% of the increase in the
body mass index (BMI) in the United States
can be explained by declines in real food
prices. Mendez and Popkin observe how food
choices are influenced by prices in both
developing and developed countries. The
study from the previous paragraph by Bleich
et al. finds a correlation between lower relative
food prices and increased caloric supply;
moreover, increased caloric supply accounts
for over 80% of adult obesity in the developed
countries they examine. Senauer and Gemma
note the fall in the relative price of food
because of technological advances and the
attempts of economists to explain the rise in
obesity because of lower costs for food and
higher costs for physical activity. Gelbach,
Klick, and Stratmann found a statistically
significant relationship between increases in
the price of healthy foods and increases in
BMI, although they did not find this relation-
ship to be economically significant. Particu-
larly relevant to this study, Loureiro and
Nayga find that agricultural policies that
increase consumer support estimates in OECD
countries can potentially reduce obesity
through higher food prices. Huffman et al.
find that an increase in the price of food
‘‘reduces tendencies for obesity,’’ which in
their results leads to a reduction in mortality
because of obesity. Huffman et al., pp. 21, 23,
25, also note that countries with higher real
food prices tend to have fewer deaths associ-
ated with obesity. Significantly, they state,
‘‘high income countries that have pursued
cheap food policies have increased the likeli-
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than other high income countries.’’
Thus, given research demonstrating how
the relative cost of food can, in many cases,
affect rates of obesity, a model with factors
that significantly affect the affordability of
food should provide insights into obesity-
related issues. Moreover, several of the studies
referenced above, in addition to the article by
Loureiro and Nayga, discuss potential links to
obesity and agricultural policies. Mendez and
Popkin note that subsidies or other incentives
can be used to make healthy fruits and
vegetables more affordable. They note China,
as part of the nation’s nutrition plan, has
promoted production and consumption of
soybeans as an alternative to the use of meat.
Mendez and Popkin further suggest that
developing countries should investigate poli-
cies that promote the use of pulse crops as
protein substitutes to reduce intake of less
healthy meats. Senauer and Gemma conclude
that because only a fraction of retail food
prices are represented by commodity costs, the
effect of agricultural subsidies on food choices
is probably less than might be expected.
Huffman et al. discuss the cheap food policies
of high-income, developed countries, stating
these policies ‘‘are bad for human health.’’
These policies can include subsidized food
prices or subsidies for inputs, technology, or
both. They note, however, that the high-
income supports of Switzerland and Japan
might be exceptions. Schmidhuber’s analysis
finds that the OECD countries with the
highest Producer Support Estimates have the
lowest levels of obesity (Switzerland, South
Korea, and Japan), whereas countries with
lower levels of support have much higher
obesity rates (United States, Australia, and
New Zealand). In determining whether these
factors are merely correlated or whether a
causal relationship exists, he notes that
developed countries usually have much higher
margins between producer prices and retail
food prices than developing countries because
more services are included in the price. Thus,
Schmidhuber notes that policies that affect
producer prices in these countries would likely
have little effect on consumer food choices. On
the basis of the findings discussed above, we
hypothesize that the model developed in this
paper will generate results similar to those of
Miller and Coble, not only for the United
States, but for similar developed and develop-
ing nations as well.
Data
Because of our interest in the effect of
agricultural policies on the affordability of
food, we construct the dependent variable in
the model as a ratio of two variables. The
numerator of this ratio is the Consumer Price
Index for food as reported by the OECD. The
denominator is an index of gross national
income per capita also reported by the OECD.
We convert OECD’s per capita measure to an
index by dividing the value for each year in the
data set we use by the value reported for the
year 2000, which is our base year, and
multiplying the result by 100. Our dependent
variable therefore becomes a ratio of two
indices, each with a base year of 2000, a
procedure similar to the construction of the
dependent variable in the SUR model of
Miller and Coble. The gross national income
data are available through 2004; OECD has
yet to report values for Japan and Mexico for
2005.
The model uses four independent variables:
an agricultural productivity index, a value-
added measure, PSEs reported by OECD as a
percentage of gross agricultural receipts, and
the Nominal Consumer Protection Coefficient
as reported by OECD. The FAO reports its
agricultural productivity index on an annual
basis for all of the OECD countries used in
our study. The indices generally reflect an
upward trend in productivity, with some
notable exceptions. The index has a base
period of 1999–2001, so the average value of
the index over these three years equals 100.
We also obtain the value-added measure
from FAO, which reports a value for each of
the countries in our study annually. The
measure that FAO reports is the value added
to the overall economy (i.e., GDP) by
individual industries—for our purposes, the
value added by agriculture, forestry, hunting,
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farm gate value of production and do not
reflect the value added to agricultural com-
modities. To control for the size of each
nation’s individual economy, we reported the
value added as a percentage of GDP, as
reported by FAO. FAO reports this value in
current U.S. dollars for each country. The
purpose of including this variable is to
incorporate a measure of the importance of
agriculture to the economy of each nation.
The measure of agricultural support in
each country in our model is the PSE as a
percentage of gross agricultural receipts,
values that OECD reports for each nation in
our model. OECD describes its calculations of
PSEs (as well as Consumer Support Estimates
[CSEs]) in detail, and we will not attempt to
expound on these explanations; we include
this measure to represent transfers from
taxpayers to agricultural producers. We use
the value as a percentage of agricultural
receipts to control for the size of each nation’s
individual economy, as with our value-added
variable. The availability of PSE data from
OECD prevents our model from using infor-
mation before 1986, the first year for which
OECD provides such data. Thus, our model
uses 19 observations for each variable in each
country from 1986 to 2004. Figure 1 depicts
the values of the PSE data as reported by
OECD, in this case, the average values over
1986–1988, the beginning of the period, and
the average value at the end of the period,
2003–2005. Clearly, Figure 1 indicates that
Iceland, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland
provide relatively much higher levels of
support compared with each country’s GDP
than do the other nations. This comparison
holds at both the beginning and end of the
period. Each country, with the exception of
Turkey, has a lower value at the end of the
period than at the beginning, and generally,
the same relations between the measures hold.
The final independent variable included in
our model is also a measure of agricultural
support reported by OECD but probably not
as well known: CNPC. OECD calculates
NPCs for both producers and consumers,
and we include the CNPC to capture the
effects on consumers of a nation’s protection-
ist agricultural policies. A value of 1.00 reflects
that the domestic price equals the ‘‘border
price,’’ or the price consumers pay at the farm
gate in the absence of trade restrictions. Thus,
as noted by the OECD, p. 17, the CNPC is
effectively ‘‘the average rate of the implicit
import tax applied in the domestic market.’’
OECD publications also describe NPC mea-
sures in detail. Figure 2 depicts the values of
these coefficients in the same fashion as
Figure 1 depicts the PSE percentages. Inter-
estingly, essentially the same relationships
prevail as for the PSE data. However, the
four highest values in the 1986–1988 period
are much lower in the 2003–2005 period,
Figure 1. Producer Support Estimates as a Percentage of Gross Farm Receipts, Averages
1986–1988 and 2003–2005. Source: OECD, PSE/CSE Database 2006
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values. The coefficient values for the other
countries are relatively low in both periods,
but all countries except Turkey report lower
values in the 2003–2005 period.
Model
We estimate a panel model for the 10 OECD
countries with the variables as defined above.
The equation for each OECD country in the
model is initially
ð1Þ
CFit ~ b1 z b2VAit z b3APit
z b3PPit z b4PCit z uit
where, for each country i (i 5 1, 2, . . . , 10) in
each year t (t 5 1986, 1987, . . . , 2004), CF is
the ratio of the CPI for food to the gross
national income index, VA is the percentage of
GDP contributed by agriculture, PP is the
PSE as a percentage of agricultural receipts,
and PC is the CNPC.
However, because of the differences across
OECD countries in support for and protection
of agriculture, we create two sets of dummy
variables as slope shifters to group these
countries. The first country group consists of
data for the nations of Iceland, Japan, Nor-
way, and Switzerland, the countries that have
the highest PSE and CNPC measures in our
data set. Similarly, the second country group
has data for the nations of Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States, which have
lower PSE and CNPC measures. The other
countries remaining in the model are Canada,
Mexico, and Turkey. Thus, with the addition
of these dummy variables, the model becomes
ð2Þ








where, for each country i (i 5 1, 2, . . . , 10) in
each year t (t 5 1986, 1987, . . . , 2004), the
previous variables are as defined in Equa-
tion (1), H is a vector of dummy variables for
each independent variable for countries with
relatively high support, and L is a vector of
dummy variables for each independent vari-
able for countries with relatively low support.
We use the SAS software package to
execute a time series cross-sectional regression
model according to the Parks method, which
provides for an autoregressive model. Table 1
presents the results of this model. For the
model in Table 1, R
2 5 .434.
Results
The independent variable for value added to
GDP by agriculture is not significant at the .05
level, indicating the relative size of each
country’s agriculture industry does not signif-
icantly affect our measure of food affordabil-
ity. The average value as a percentage of GDP
Figure 2. Consumer Nominal Protection Coefficients, Averages 1986–1988 and 2003–2005.
Source: OECD, PSE/CSE Database 2006
Miller and Coble: Effects of Government Support on Food Budget Shares 555does not exceed 10% for any of the OECD
countries we examined, and the values change
relatively little for most of the countries over
the 1986–2004 period.
The agricultural productivity index is
statistically significant and negative, indicating
that as a country’s agricultural technology
improves, food becomes more affordable by
our measure. This expected finding concurs
with the results of the models of Miller and
Coble.
PSEs as a percentage of agricultural
receipts is also a significant and negative
variable at the .05 level. This variable indicates
that as a country’s PSE estimate becomes
larger relative to agricultural receipts, food by
our measure becomes more affordable. Given
the levels of PSEs provided by several of the
OECD countries in our model, as noted by
Huffman et al. and others, this finding is not
entirely unexpected.
The other variable measuring support to
agriculture, the CNPC, is also significant. Its
coefficient value is positive, however, indicat-
ing that protectionist measures make food
relatively more expensive for consumers by
our ratio variable.
The remaining variables reported in Ta-
ble 1 represent the two sets of dummy
variables for the group of OECD countries
with relatively high support and protection
measures (Iceland, Japan, Norway, and Swit-
zerland) and those with relatively low support
and protection measures (Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States). Because of
the nature of the panel regression model used,
the significance and sign of the coefficients on
these variables, one should interpret them
relative to the corresponding independent
variables.
Both dummy variables for valued added by
agriculture lack significance, indicating that
neither is significantly different from the
value-added independent variable. Thus, be-
cause this variable is not significant, value
added by agriculture lacks significance for any
of the OECD countries in our model.
The dummy variables for agricultural
productivity are both significant and positive
for the ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ support countries.
These coefficients indicate that, for both
groups of countries, agricultural productivity
has a smaller effect on our ratio variable
relative to the effect on Canada, Mexico, and
Turkey. The reason for this finding is not
entirely clear, although the agriculture pro-
ductivity indices for Japan, Norway, and
Switzerland all trend down over the 1986–
2004 period.
The dummy variable for PSE as a percent-
age of agricultural receipts for the ‘‘high’’-
support countries is not statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that the effect of PSEs for
these countries is similar to that for Canada,
Mexico, and Turkey. The relatively high levels
of support to agriculture provided by Iceland,
Japan, Norway, and Switzerland might ex-
plain this finding. The coefficient on the
dummy variable for PSEs for the ‘‘low’’-
support countries is significant, positive, and
roughly the same size as the coefficient for the
independent variable for PSEs. The finding
that these two PSE variables could effectively
offset each other indicates that the support
provided to agricultural producers in Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and the United States has
little effect on our ratio variable. Such a result
is consistent with those of Miller and Coble
and, given that Australia and New Zealand
provide the lowest levels of support among
OECD countries, makes sense.

















a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Statistical significance at the a 5 .05 level.
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measure are significant at the .05 level and
negative for both groups of countries, indicat-
ing the effects are smaller for these countries.
The negative coefficient on the CNPC dummy
variable for the ‘‘high’’ protection countries
does not offset the coefficient of the CNPC
independent variable, indicating that an over-
all positive effect remains for this group of
countries. However, the negative coefficient
on the dummy variable for the ‘‘low’’ support
countries more than offsets the coefficient of
the CNPC independent variable, effectively
indicating the protections in these countries—
or more appropriately the lack thereof—make
food relatively less expensive than in Canada,
Mexico, and Turkey. The meaning of such a
negative value in this context is not clear to us.
Mexico and Turkey are the only two countries
that have CNPC values trending up over the
period we examine.
Conclusions
In this paper, we attempt to evaluate econo-
metrically the effect of government support to
agriculture on a measure of the affordability
of food in 10 OECD countries. The panel
model we construct specifically utilizes two
values calculated by the OECD: Producer
Support Estimates as a percentage of gross
farm receipts and the Consumer Nominal
Protection Coefficient. These two variables
represent transfers from taxpayers to agricul-
tural producers through government pro-
grams and transfers from consumers to
government through protectionist measures,
respectively. By the use of dummy variables,
we find implications for groups of countries
on the basis of their relative levels of support
and protection. For Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States, countries with relative-
ly low levels of government support and few
protectionist measures over the period we
examine, our results indicate government
involvement in agriculture has little effect on
the affordability of food in these countries.
These findings for the United States are
consistent with those of Miller and Coble in
their study on the effect of direct government
payments to agricultural producers on the
affordability of food.
For the other countries in our model, we
find PSEs as a percentage of gross farm
receipts and CNPCs both significantly affect
our measure of the affordability of food.
However, readers should keep some caveats
in mind when assessing these results. Fore-
most, we note that the relative effects of
supportprogramscomparedwith protectionist
actions affect the implications of our findings.
For example, Japan provides relatively high
support and protection to its agriculture, but
the protection might have a larger effect than
the support, affecting food prices positively as
Loureiro and Nayga discuss. In addition, we
grouped two sets of countries together on the
basis of relative levels of support and protec-
tion to agriculture to form dummy variables.
This grouping left three countries in our model
not included in either dummy variable: Cana-
da, Mexico, and Turkey. These three countries
represent a rather arbitrary selection, in that
Canada is more developed than Mexico and
Turkey, although all three countries are
relatively ‘‘middle of the road’’ in terms of
support and protection provided to agriculture
compared with the other OECD countries.
However, both support and protection mea-
sures trend up and fluctuate more in Mexico
and Turkey, whereas in Canada, both vari-
ables trend down and change less year to year.
Thus, support and protectionist measures
might not affect the affordability of food in
the same way in each of these three countries.
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